Standards of behaviour govern the lives of individuals - or, fashion their self-identity - or, represent their actuality (Hegel, [1821] 1991: 190). Therefore, an individual’s ethics can be regarded as a self-policing mechanism that can stimulate self-control, motivate adherence to matters of principle, accentuate feelings and give rise to lines of thought.
In this context, it is proposed that normative ethics or general theories about “what ought to be“ (Taylor, 1975: 175), can be understood in the context of four discrete ethical models.
Kant’s Universal Moral Feeling
Moral activity for Kant can be distanced from emotional involvement, thus through ‘recurring patterns of social behaviour that determine the nature of human action’ (Parker, 2000: 125) moral motivations take the individual to a position of understanding actions that are right and permissible, and therefore actions that are wrong. Moreover, the universal system of Kant ([1785a] 1998 and [1797] 1963) formulates the principle that morality be derived a priori or from pure reason, instead of individual experience. In this paradigm he insists that for people to accept moral laws, their construction must be ‘freed from everything which may be only empirical’ (Kant, [1785a] 1998: 289).
When an individual acknowledges their moral obligations, they accept ‘the categorical imperative,’ or that moral rule that recognises that human characteristics - such as loyalty and duty -- possess a discrete inherent value. This distinction is clarified by Kant in his statement that if an ‘action is good only as a means to something else, then the imperative is hypothetical; if it is conceived as good in itself and consequently as being necessarily the principle of a will which of itself conforms to reason, then it is categorical ‘ ([1785b] 2003: 2). Following this assertion he proceeds to confirm the existence of ‘but one categorical imperative, namely this: Act only on that maxim whereby thou can’st at the same time will that it should become a universal law’ (Kant, [1785b] 2003: 6).
Kant’s separation of moral rightness from the various values, attitudes and behaviour that individual’s encounter when working with a community[i] seems to neglect the moral stimuli that can motivate differing moral emotions and feelings. Therefore, there is a need to initiate a different moral methodology that can help elucidate the complexities of the moral paradigm.
The Deontological Ethical Model
Pure human reason, which inspires individuals to observe the categorical imperative, is now tempered with notions of political influence in an analysis of the ‘interest’ ethics of Machiavelli, Hobbes and Burke.
Truth and Deceit
Machiavellianism consistently links power with responsibilities so the state must have the vision to acknowledge their duties to their subjects to achieve the maintenance of social stability. Therefore, ‘there is nothing more difficult to handle, more doubtful of success and more dangerous to carry through than initiating changes in a state’s constitution’ (Machiavelli, [1513] 1999: 19).
In this scenario public servants working in a community setting need to sustain a strong and feared bureaucracy that is miserly in spending state funds and so avoids any attempt to adopt humane ‘popularist’ measures that distort the delicate balance between duties and obligations. Nevertheless, the deontological ethical base underpinning this matrix remains intact as, if citizens of a state escape their benevolent servitude they would become ‘the prey of the first comer who seeks to chain…[them]…up again’ (Machiavelli,[1518] 1969: 153).
The Responsibilities of Absolute Power
Hobbes, like Machiavelli, developed his philosophy in turbulent times. The latter experienced the religious and secular tyranny of the Italian City States whilst Hobbes grew up in the aftermath of the Spanish Armada, lived through the English Civil War then experienced the Restoration in 1660. Thus, he concluded that without a Commonwealth, or ‘Leviathan’, citizens would experience ‘no arts, no letters, no society, and which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death, and the life of man solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’ ([1651] 1996: 89). Therefore, he proposed the greater happiness of humanity through the promotion of individual self-interest as the ultimate principle of ethics thereby upgrading this notion from merely a means to a desirable end (Taylor, 1975: 47). This concept is deontological in the public sphere, where out of self-interest ‘we all must transfer our rights to judge good and evil to a sovereign authority, which will lay down laws that will regulate our pursuit of our desires’ (Ross, 2006: 30) but telelogical, or without commitment to a particular purpose, in the private sphere.
The Supremacy of Good Order
The tumultuous experiences of Machiavelli and Hobbes were mirrored in the life of Burke, an Englishman who witnessed the French Revolution (1789–1794) and the American War of Independence (1775–1783). These events inspired his belief in a code of order and stability that had evolved through the wisdom of ages. Thus, some community members might embrace Burke’s prosthetic of re-inspiring politics with a religious vision (Gaede, 1983: 110) to explain the unfair distribution of resources.
Practical Deontological Imperatives for the Community
Deontological principles accord with restraint on individual initiative as society forms the individuals who create it in a continuous dialectic. Thus, bureaucratic structures that function like sophisticated machines with a clearly defined hierarchy of full-time and salaried personnel, separated from the resources that they direct, (Weber, [1904] 1976) employ the knowledge of their professional employees to exercise control over individual agency.
Deontological moral truth perceives the individual as subordinate to the community, but the community is subordinate to the state. This objective is implicit within the following imperatives:
· The state should, as far as possible, control the supply of finance for community initiatives thereby cementing the bond between the elite and community members.
· Initiatives taken at community level should be instigated by public servants aiming to indoctrinate community members into a state-inspired identity.
· Moral activity for community members lies in the individual finding her or his station or position in life, then carrying out its duties.
The Consequentialist Ethical Model
Community members that embrace this paradigm conclude that the goodness of actions is judged on whether they create some a good situation. Thus, ‘the moral value of any action always lies in its consequences, and it is by reference to these consequences that actions, and indeed such things as institutions, law and practices are to be justified if they can be justified at all’ (Smart and Williams, 1973: 79).
Market Outcomes and Act Utilitarianism
In making the value judgement that an action that results in the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people is morally right the proposition expresses a value-predicate - happiness - that is applied to the subject - the greatest number of people - so, adherents would accept that ethical statements should be articulated in the terms of social aggregation and expect the value-predicate of happiness to be analysed in objective denominations that measure the extent of material well-being (Taylor, 1975: 176).
Therefore, individuals require an instrument to negotiate the preferred constituents of their own vision of well-being with others. Such an instrument is the actualisation of the following three propositions.
The first proposition, made by Hayek (1960) and Acton (1971), maintains that a just market transaction, where there is freedom to negotiate binding contracts in full awareness of personal rights and responsibilities, is one devoid of coercion. The second proposition is that premeditation is a necessary pre-requisite for an action to be deemed unjust, which means that outcomes from self-interested market transactions cannot be unjust. Instead, daily transactions, which together constitute market activity, produce a spontaneous order amongst market participants that is not directed by pre-determined measures of income re-distribution (Hayek, 1978: 183). The third proposition is that while players in the market can serve moral imperatives ‘the market mechanism does not especially reward us for satisfying those desires, rather than other desires that are neutral towards or even retard those people’s development’ (Nozick, 1981: 514). Thus, as no generally agreed principles for the distribution of goods exists, there can be no moral case for the free market to answer. Therefore, those community members who endorse the act-utilitarian ethical principle, are conceptualising their primary unit of social transaction -- the market transaction – ‘as happenings outside one’s moral self’ (Smart and Williams, 1973: 104).
Satisfying Desires through Rule Utilitarianism
Mill ([1859] 1989) was unequivocal in regarding utility or engaging in the right actions that produce the greater good, as the ultimate ethical principle. However, he applied the following condition (p.14):
it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being. Those interests I contend, authorise the subjection of individual spontaneity to external control, only in respect to those actions of each, which concern the interest of other people.
Therefore, Mill has refined the doctrine of utilitarianism by recognising differences in the quality and quantity of anticipated pleasures. He follows the Epicurean[ii] tradition that living a good life is synonymous with maximising pleasure, so, for him intellectual gratification is more important than physical sensations, and altruistic actions can satisfy individual desires.
Practical Consequentialist Imperatives for the Community
Consequentialist principles accord with an objective social world, knowable by the application of the scientific method, in which people are agents of their actions, with their behaviour made predictable by their unconstrained self-interest. This proposition is implicit within the following imperatives:
· The unemployed, in return for state benefits, should be educated into productive patterns of behaviour through their involvement as participating community members in community projects.
· The state should, as far as possible, refrain from funding community projects thereby leaving local communities to compete for finance from non-governmental organisations.
· Community projects should be solely concerned with the production of facilities and services not available through the operation of the marketplace.
· The moral rightness of individual actions can best be judged by the goodness of its consequences, hence the end, which makes such an action intrinsically good, justifies the means.
The Model of Virtue Ethics
Public servants can recognise this model through the subjective notions of virtue being primary rather than derivative for the community member. Thus, their observance leads to adherents experiencing feelings of well-being as valued members of their communities as virtuous behaviour emerges from jointly affirmed social norms.
Tam (1998), in proposing an agenda for British Communitarianism, wrote of the influence exerted by Aristotle ([c.335-322 BC] 1996: 3-4) on contemporary discussions concerning moral virtues. Aristotle’s concluded that every person’s experiences were holistic, thus we all have the potential to access the total of available knowledge. Therefore, ‘all citizens can learn to behave morally and make political judgements. The virtues to cultivate and the duties to fulfil in any community…[need]…not be matters to be left to a special minority’ (Tam, 1998: 19).
Therefore, virtue ethics differs from both consequential and deontological systems, as the natural way to live is understood to be found in the dispositions that cause individuals to act in certain ways.
The Anatomy of Virtue
The virtues that people cultivate might differ in different societies, however, the provision of a list of virtue concepts fails to address the unavoidable necessity of relating these concepts to other notions of morality. To address this deficiency MacIntyre restates the original Aristotelian conception of virtue by introducing the role of ‘practices’ into ethical theory. He defines a ‘practice’ as ‘any coherent and complex form of socially established co-operative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realised’ (MacIntyre, 1985: 187).
As adherents to virtue ethics hold that the common good in a community lies within ‘human interaction which transcends private advantage,’ such an aspiration ‘would presuppose the disappearance of selfish motives from the face of the earth’ (Ryn, 1978: 85–86). Therefore, community members must embody in their virtue ethics the acceptability of pursuing, within socially negotiated, if constrained limits, personal well-being and pleasure. Furthermore, by embracing moral diversity, they must address the permissiveness within this code that can accept practices such as female circumcision, ‘just as long as that code can be related back to a culture that sustains it’ (Lang, 2002: 25).
Human Essence and the Acquisition of Virtue
Virtue ethics differ from other ethical doctrines in acknowledging the relevance social settings have to the construction of individual ethical attitudes. This belief resonates with Rousseau’s proposition ([1755] 1993), that people might once have lived in a natural state, uncontaminated by the artificial nature of the enlightened society, where non-competitive sociability was the norm.
Practical Virtue Imperatives for the Community
The principles of virtue ethics require a collective understanding that facilitates the social construction of virtuous principles. So, an ethical reality emerges that is distinct from both the collectivism of deontological principles and the individualism of consequentialism. This proposition is implicit within the following imperatives:
· Communities should mediate between the individual community member and the state to facilitate both the co-operative enquiry and influence of every citizen in such matters as the formulation and implementation of social policy.
· Community Members should readily recognise their moral obligation to participate in communities so that they can fulfil their responsibilities to other community members.
· As there is no single true morality across time, societies and individuals a moral act is one where a good action is accompanied by good intentions, and the right emotions and feelings.
The Model of Ethical Scepticism
The contemporary notion of moral scepticism can trace back its tradition to Pyrrho[iii] who lived according to the precepts of balancing opposing opinions, or suspending opinion, with the goal of achieving tranquillity. Therefore, sceptics are in a state of ethical doubt, which distances them from both those who are certain they have found the moral truth and those who claim that there is no truth at all (Lom, 1998: 8–9). In this world of undifferentiated ethical options, the individual community member may take recourse to the philosophy of Schopenhauer ([1819] 1995) and Nietzsche ([1886] 1966), who both offer the notion of ‘the will’, together with the theorising of Sartre ([1960] 1976), who explores and analyses the concept of ‘authenticity.’
Personal Responsibility and the Moral Agent
Schopenhauer understood human essence as ‘will’, embodied in the life of individuals as a striving desire to exist in a world of representation. However, ‘will’ is also an idea that is a complete conception of a species. Thus, ‘will’ in the individual is just a temporary aberration until the timeless ‘will’ leaves the individual at their death (Schopenhauer, [1839] 1999: 88).
Schopenhauer does not associate ‘will’ with a divine being but instead, sees it as the source of human suffering as individuals pursue their futile purposes in a world of representation ([1819] 1995). However, Nietzsche offers a very different description that positively associates ‘will’ with power. He indicts the herd-instinct as the deliberating source of power amongst humanity that renders individuals weak but the collective strong. The group engages in social compromise that encourages continual moral censure leading Nietzsche to answer his question – ‘How is man to be maintained?’ - with the response – ‘How is man to be surpassed?’ ([1883] 1967: 326). Nihilism is the outcome of an indifference to creativity, encouraged by hypocrisy and the fear of condemnation encompassed in Zarathustra’s[iv] statement - ‘sombre is human life, and as yet without meaning: a buffoon may be fateful to it’. However, he then asserts, ‘I want to teach men the sense of their existence, which is the Superman, the lightening out of the dark cloud – man’ (Nietzsche, [1883] 1967: 75).
For those that adopt this single-minded pathway, Nietzsche, in the three essays that constitute the ‘Genealogy of Morals’ ([1887] 2003), applauds their noble character in determining their own values after rejecting the ethics of duty, that parade as a disguise for obedience. Neitzche exhorts them to re-discover the Ancient Greek doctrine of noble ethics, which values - above all else - pride, boldness and self-affirmation.
For Sartre ([1960] 1976), the notion of authenticity is fundamental to people’s need to make choices throughout their lives in the full awareness that they can create all aspects of their characters. Sartre offers the following rudimentary guidelines for a practical basis of ethical conduct. Firstly, when individuals pledge themselves to a group, this solemn agreement ‘should be defined as everyone’s freedom guaranteeing the security of all so that this security can return to everyone as his other-freedom’ (Sartre, [1960] 1976: 428). This implies that everyone should internalise a primary concern - to ensure that the results of their actions do not diminish the free will of other individuals. Secondly, Sartre ([1960] 1976: 599--600) asserts that ‘everyone comes to everyone, through the community, as a bearer of the same essentiality. Thirdly, Sartre ([1960] 1976: 374) argues that individuals in a pledged group can facilitate the totality of reciprocities amongst other members.
These three imperatives all promote respect for the individual’s viewpoint, which crystallises around the discipline of ensuring that there is freedom for every community member to fully believe in, and express, their own opinions.
Ethical Scepticism and its Consequences
Ethical sceptics would accept ‘that there are no moral truths, that there is no moral knowledge, that in morals and politics all that we can ultimately do is to commit ourselves’ (Bambrough, 1979: 14). Thus, objective ethical reasoning propositions are rejected.
Community members who embrace ethical scepticism cannot claim to follow an ethical doctrine that offers a universal code for the redemption of humanity. Thus, moral principles are understood as fluid, flexible, sometimes ambiguous and only effective after individual justification.
Practical Sceptical Imperatives for the Community
The principles of ethical scepticism presumes a subjective social world that is contestably knowable as what individuals believe it to be, with individual community members constrained by their subjective perception of social reality, which makes human behaviour unpredictable.
Implicit within ethical scepticism is a moral truth that perceives a social world where moral knowledge or moral reasoning is impossible. This proposition is implicit within the following imperatives:
· Public servants should seek to facilitate co-operative participation in community initiatives, but they should not attempt to impose an external agenda on individual community members.
· Attempts to achieve a common purpose amongst community members should be regarded as eroding individual autonomy.
· The processes and outcomes from community engagement should be distanced from state and economic power to ensure that individual community members can maintain control over their own lives.
· Moral beliefs are just matters of personal taste because moral truths are simply unknowable.
Conclusion
Public servants, such as politicians, police officers, central or local government officials, members of the emergency services, social workers or community health workers, might enter engagement with community members on the presumption that they will encounter a shared set of moral imperatives. However, this presumption might well be incorrect as a quadripartite ethical discourse could emerge that presents four differing and discrete sets of contentions about the formulation of community members’ values, attitudes and behaviour. The presence of these contending, but completely legitimate, ethical frameworks require the individual working with a community, without recourse to self-deception or self-delusion, to build a consensus around these contending positions.
It is proposed that this demanding, but possibly inevitable, course of action will require constant reflection, a willingness to adopt the attribute of empathy and careful and self-critical management. However, if the individual is willing to pro-actively embrace the challenges posed by ethical incongruity amongst community members then creative insights may become possible.
[i] This paper adopts Etzioni’s definition of community. This defines the concept as including all types of social groups, such as schools, organisations, families, neighbourhoods and interest groups. Thus, the definition embraces post-modern technology, rejects oppressive homogeneous networks but readily accommodates “divergent subcommunities” (Etzioni, 1995: 122).
[ii] Epicurus (341–271 BC) founded a school of philosophy that recognised that pleasure is not necessarily achieved in sensuality but rather the attributes of detachment, serenity and freedom from fear.
[iii] Pyrrho of Elis (365–275 BC) is the founder of Greek Scepticism. However, he left no writings, therefore, contemporary interpretation of his philosophy is reliant on other scholars. So, this paper has adopted the analysis provided in the writings of Montaigne (1533–92), with his interpretation of ancient scepticism as the distrust of the faculties and misapprehensions of humanity (Craig, 2005: 864).
[iv] Zarathustra is the hero of Neitzche’s best known work – Thus, Spake Zarathustra ([1883] 1967).
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