This article was written in 2006 - in 2007, Blair resigned from the Labour Party Leadership after thirteen years and was succeeded by his Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown. Labour lost the 2010 general election and the mantra "New Labour" was consigned to history.
It is interesting to compare observations made in 2006 with the approach embraced by the Labour Administration of 2024.
In the Oscar winning film “Network” Howard Beale, the mad prophet of the airwaves, exhorts his poor, disaffected and disadvantaged audience to throw open the windows of their dilapidated apartment blocks, put out their heads and yell “I’m as mad as hell, and I’m not going to take this anymore!” As Americans respond in their thousands the unmistakable sense of purposelessness in an uncertain, and often malevolent society, is instantaneously apparent. These people have little faith in the integrity and sincerity of the state having witnessed ambiguity, and sometimes, rampant hypocrisy in the attitudes, opinions and behaviour of their elected representatives. They struggle to find any moral codes or sets of principles that offer a means of interpreting the issues and agendas of modern life. Of course, this bleak picture of public discontent might be designated as belonging in the realm of cinematic invention. However, as the scenario resonates with the scepticism and cynicism that pervades those in contemporary British Society who experience “the restricted citizenship of those who are poor" (Beresford et al., 1999: 27), it seems to warrant more than dismissal as dramatic license.
It is probable that, as the role of the state in advanced liberal democracies has become increasingly restrained due to the ineffectiveness in both the formulation and implementation of public service policy provision (Hult and Walcott 1990, Kooiman 1993, Weimer and Vining 1997) and the policy constraints caused by fiscal controls that have arisen from the globalisation of economic supply and demand (Bovens and t’Hart 1990, Bovens et al., 2001, Gray 1998, Sieber 1981) that the traditional precepts of bureaucracy had to give way to the canons of the hollowed-out state that are informed by the principles of neo-liberal doctrine. However, these clear distinctions offer an overly simplistic framework for an adequate appreciation of the course of events that have characterised recent policymaking by the British State. Undoubtedly a traditional bureaucracy was challenged by neo-liberal conservative doctrines that upheld the principle of privatisation and recognised the supremacy of the market-based economy. However, a subsequent new labour managerialist state, that accords supremacy to regulation rather than ideological conviction, has eclipsed this economic and social experiment. Nevertheless, whilst acknowledging the differing ideological configurations, it is argued here that there has been a sustained growth in ethical scepticism caused by the belief that the state has embraced values that are unjustified, unreasonable and uncertain during the various political administrations of Margaret Thatcher, John Major and Tony Blair. To contextualise this assertion this paper begins by briefly reviewing the ethical foundations of the traditional bureaucratic state.
Deontological Ethics and the Bureaucratic Model
In this ethical paradigm the appropriate role of the state accords with deontological principles that restrain individual initiative by imposing “the recurrent patterns of social behaviour that determine the nature of human action” (Parker, 2000: 125). Thus, bureaucratic structures that function like sophisticated machines with a clearly defined hierarchy of full-time and salaried personnel, separated from the resources that they direct, (Weber [1904] 1976) employ their knowledge and that of their professional subordinates to exercise control over individual agency. So, structure has assumed a causal capacity as individuals’ decreed duties become objectively knowable.
Therefore, deontological ethics are concerned with what individual duties are, who has rights, and what strategy is best able to produce justice. These fundamental precepts lead to the development of a code that defines what actions are right and permissible, and thus what actions are wrong. As Blackburn observes, “they take us beyond what we admire, or regret, or prefer, or even what we want other people to prefer. They take us to thoughts about what is due. They take us to demands” (2001: 60). As Kant concluded, these demands are derived a priori or from pure reason instead of individual experience. He insisted that for people to accept moral laws their construction must be “freed from everything which may be only empirical” (Kant, [1785a] 1998: 289). Thus, individuals do not construct their morality by considering the consequences of their actions, but, instead, discover their inherent capacity to act morally or dutifully. This process of enlightenment lies at a deeper level than that of affectation, as individual behaviour should fully comply with the intent of a duty, rather than just observe its tenets, if a person is to achieve the postulates of Kantian “good will.” From this process of subjective awareness there arises a code of objective ethics, which accords with the thinking of the elitist in that impartial standards of behaviour are created, which can be subject to dispassionate judgement. As Kant maintains, judgement must be passed on what is right and what is wrong using pure practical reason thus making morality absolute.
When a person acknowledges their moral obligations, they accept “the categorical imperative,” or that moral rule that recognises that human characteristics — such as loyalty and duty — possess a discrete inherent value. This distinction is clarified by Kant in his statement that if an “action is good only as a means to something else, then the imperative is hypothetical; if it is conceived as good in itself and consequently as being necessarily the principle of a will which of itself conforms to reason, then it is categorical “ ([1785b] 2003: 2). Following this assertion he proceeds to confirm the existence of “but one categorical imperative, namely this: Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law” (Kant, [1785b] 2003: 6). This fundamental principle is often cast into the popular saying “do unto others as you expect them to do to you” although this cliché does not fully accommodate the extent of Kant’s insight.
Pure human reason, which inspires individuals to observe the categorical imperative, was effectively tempered by Edmund Burke’s political vision of the supremacy of good order. In his envisaged sequence of events, politics was to be inspired with a religious vision to explain the unfair distribution of resources (Gaede, 1983: 110). Thus, as religion is the grand prejudice, using the suffering experienced in this life as a portent of rewards in the next, Burke dismisses his detractors with the assertion “you think you are combating prejudice, but you are at war with nature” ([1790] 1993: 49). Moreover, the well-ordered state, a product of a slowly evolving and traditionally informed pattern of governance acts as a moral mainstay as custom reconciles us to everything” (Burke, [1756] 1987: 148). In this schema subjects enter a special relationship with their society as “it is a partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership in every virtue and in all perfection“ (Burke, [1790] 1993: 96). This ethereal bond is held together with a code of deontological ethics where the elite accept their obligations to their subjects in return for the proper fulfilment of duties owed to the state and its dominant hegemonies.
Burke’s prosthetic to re-inspire political dialogue had an influential and lasting effect. Its enduring relevance and effectiveness are reflected in Walter Bagehot, the Victorian constitutional expert, finding the attitude of the English working class towards authority as rudimentarily “deferential” ([1897] 1963: 235). Moreover, this observation could have been labelled quintessentially European as the masses of Germany, France and Britain enthusiastically marched to war in 1914, more than adequately demonstrating the manner that majoritarian democratic societies were able to harness the notion of patriotism through gradual, and sometimes even overdue, concessions to their poorer citizens to ensure their compliance in an endeavour of unparalleled massacre. However, as the example of the Russian Revolution was to emphatically demonstrate, these manoeuvres were for the highest stakes with permanent social change a consequence of their failure (Hobsbawn, 1987: 164).
The inter-war years witnessed pressure on the British State “to take on greater social responsibilities and to intervene to provide direct help to the most vulnerable sections of the community” (Stevenson, 1984: 306). The further concessions made during this period were then incorporated in the institutions of the Welfare State in the 1940s. This balance of rights and obligations were to become “genuinely popular with the mass of the electorate of all classes” (Glennerster, 1995: 12) during the subsequent decades.
However, by the 1970’s the notion of a political social policy settlement was disintegrating in the realities of rampant inflation, industrial strife and substantial increases in the price of oil. The traditional bureaucracy, with its deontological ethical underpinnings, appeared incapable of addressing the need for economic re-structuring thereby ushering in a decade of what was to become known as “Thatcherism”. This body of thought had found some of its fundamental ethical tenets in the principles of consequentialism where free beings can only be motivated by material reward. It is in this imperative, which now informed the formulation of public policy, that the seeds of scepticism might have been sown.
Consequential Ethics and Neo-liberal Conservatism
In this ethical paradigm the appropriate role of the state accords with consequentialist principles that recognises that an individual has both the causal capacity to act and the discernment to objectively assess whether the likely results from their actions will have good or bad consequences. Thus, “the moral value of any action always lies within its consequences, and it is by reference to these consequences that actions, and indeed such things as institutions, law and practices are to be justified if they can be justified as all” (Smart and Williams, 1973: 79).
In making the value judgement that an action that results in the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people is morally right the proposition expresses a value-predicate — happiness — that is applied to the subject — the greatest number of people — so, neo-conservatives could accept that ethical statements should be articulated in the terms of social aggregation and expect the value-predicate of happiness to be analysed in objective denominations that measure the extent of material well-being (Taylor, 1975: 176). The need for such an instrument of measurement becomes clearer with the practical application of the act-utilitarian doctrine. This states that “the only reason for performing an action A rather than an alternative action B is that doing A will make mankind (or, perhaps all sentient beings) happier than will doing B” (Smart and Williams, 1973: 30). Thus, the neo-liberal conservative perspective, in embracing act-utilitarian ethics, require an objective means of assessing the anticipated consequences of actions, to be able to determine what would constitute the greatest aggregate or accumulative happiness. Therefore, as neo-liberal conservatives would choose to negotiate the preferred constituents of their own well-being with others, they rely on the mechanisms of the free market to act as an instrument of evaluation of social activity that facilitates judgements of ethical consequences.
Nevertheless, Plant (1999: 20–1) can identify three propositions that demonstrate the unprincipled nature of the market. When these are combined, they offer a convincing case for the rejection of the market’s capacity to convert the abstract notions of “right” or “happiness” into synthetic statements that can be measured in terms of everyone’s transactions.
The first proposition, made by Hayek (1960) and Acton (1971), maintains that a just market transaction is one devoid of coercion. As individuals enter free exchanges, where inequalities of power are redressed through the freedom to negotiate and enter binding contracts in the full awareness of their personal rights and responsibilities and of the outcomes arising from their actions, such transactions cannot be deemed to be unjust.
The second proposition is that premeditation is a necessary pre-requisite for an action to be deemed unjust, which means that outcomes from self-interested market transactions cannot be unjust. Instead, the myriad number of daily transactions, which together constitute market activity, produce a spontaneous order amongst market participants that is not directed by pre-determined measures of income re-distribution (Hayek, 1978: 183).
The third proposition is, as Nozick notes, that while players in the market can serve moral imperatives “the market mechanism does not especially reward us for satisfying those desires, rather than other desires that are neutral towards or even retard those people’s development” (1981: 514). Thus, as no generally agreed principles for the distribution of goods exists, there can be no moral case for the free market to answer.
However, as Plant concludes, neo-liberal conservatives, by embracing these three propositions and endorsing the act-utilitarian ethical principle, are conceptualising their primary unit of social transaction — the market transaction — “as happenings outside one’s moral self” (Smart and Williams, 1973: 104). By implication, then, neo-liberal conservatives “should be willing to agree that…[act-utilitarianism’s]…general aim of maximising happiness does not imply that what everyone is doing is just pursuing happiness” (Smart and Williams, 1973: 113). Instead, ostensibly rational action to maximise probable benefit can sometimes be irrational. In this case, it can perpetuate a maleficent outcome, or one that, whilst not intended, could or should have been anticipated, on a particular social group without offering any justification that such a situation is inevitable in bringing the best results for the majority.
Therefore, if neo-liberal conservatives wish to address the moral dilemma of foreseeable, adverse unintended outcomes arising from their actions they could consider the ethical consequentialism developed in Rawls theory of justice (1971), with its aim of ensuring the stability of the state. Rawls recognises that if citizens are to obey the state then a basic scheme for ordering society should include an agreement between those citizens and the state as to how that society would be conducted. These aims require a political consensus over the application of the concept of justice that extends to the details of how the principle can be morally justified. So, to achieve such an understanding, Rawls proposes a hypothetical situation. In this scenario self-interested and rational citizens who are ignorant of the position they would occupy in a future society must choose the highest possible level of income and equality of opportunity for the poorest that is acceptable to all in that society. It is assumed that all participating citizens wish to pursue the greater good and would be prudent enough to realise the need for future social stability. Thus, the outcome would establish not just fairness but the following principles of justice, stated in their order of priority, that underpin the structures of a just society (Rawls, 1971: 320):
“First principle: Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.
Second principle: Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:
(a) To the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and
(b) Attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.”
These Rawlsian principles are designed to govern the manner the basic political, economic and social institutions, mould and voluntarily constrain the agent. Therefore, Rawls has constructed an artificial situation where citizens have co-operated with the objective of advancing their self-interest by ensuring the fairness of social outcomes. Thus, this agreement is envisaged as the product of a wide reflective equilibrium that has successfully challenged citizens to confront their values and re-assess their priorities to ensure an effective and equitable meritocracy in their own self-interest.
Therefore, if neo-liberal conservatives dismiss Rawl’s theorising then they must face the apparent failure of market mechanisms to eradicate poverty. Although the trickle-down effect from wealth creation may lift some citizens from absolute deprivation they would continue to suffer relative imbalances in their property rights that leaves them dis-empowered relative to the affluent. This outcome reflects a desire in the marketplace to separate economic reality from social reality giving rise to the mechanical economic machine metaphor. So, instead of realising some individual’s internalised desires for freedom, the marketplace can present a series of constraints that impel acquiescence to economic rationality (Bourdieu, 1998: 96). It follows that “adaptation becomes the highest goal of character formation” (Beck, 1998: 13) in the free-market environment leaving those who adhere to the tenets of consequentialism to ponder whether they should “rejoice in the market economy, but reject the market society” (Plant, 1999: 24).
There is no doubt that the decade of Thatcherism benefited some lower income communities. For instance, those who had paid rent for most of their lives were allowed to buy their council houses and experience the middle-class benefits of re-mortgaging to buy a new car or in taking the holiday of a lifetime. Similarly, lower income families could now own part of the equity of a privatised utility as previously nationalised industries were floated on the stock exchange and neo-liberal conservative acolytes promulgated dreams of a share owning democracy. Thus, many lower income families were motivated to take advantage of wealth creating opportunities as a means of embracing the virtues of self-responsibility and self-achievement in a paradigm that could lead to the realisation of their own self-worth. Nevertheless, the theoretical drawbacks of consequentialism, in the spectre of market inequalities, haunted this ideological experiment as the trickle-down effect failed to materialise and Rawl’s philosophical vision remained strictly theoretical against a backdrop of a UK market driven economy suffering from high levels of structural unemployment. Therefore, the application of a dose of ethical consequentialism had rendered lower income communities bereft of the certainties that were inherent in the ethereal bond of deontological ethics. This situation could have contributed to the nullification of the traditional working-class virtues of patriotism, obedience and compliance and the creation of a code of uninspiring ethical scepticism where apathy and disillusion are paramount.
The Ethical Dilemma of New Public Management
The election of the new political elite, branded as new labour, in 1997 did not herald a return to deontological ethical premises but instead signalled the arrival of a hybrid organisational form of new public management that sought to combine elements of neo-liberal conservatism with bureaucratic structures. This synergism results in the state employing a diverse combination of organisations to deliver public services. These encompass traditional centralised provision to devolved provision at both local and regional level and employ a variety of organisational forms ranging from corporatised and commercialised quasi-public to private-for-profit and private-non-profit (Dixon and Dogan, 2002). This complexity reflects the desire of those formulating policy to impose managerialist values and practices on service providers resulting in a counter-productive paradoxical environment (Dixon et al., 2005). In this scenario the most problematic paradox is:
that public managers are expected to manage “efficiently” and “effectively”, and so be accountable for the efficient and effective management of “inputs” used to produce “outputs” (which may be difficult to quantify, or even adequately conceptualise), which generate “outcomes” (which may be difficult to measure, or even adequately conceptualise), which relate to “programme objectives” (which may be difficult to articulate in mutually compatible and quantifiable terms), which must be compatible not only with “policy objectives” (which government may be unwilling or unable to articulate in quantifiable terms, and which may, themselves, be mutually incompatible, particularly in a multi-level political structure) but also with “customer objectives” (which may, also, be mutually incompatible).
This ambiguous public arena is offered by new labour’s proselytisers as a site where civil renewal and active citizenship can take place, facilitated by a plethora of performance management targets, which are to provide a recipe for efficient, effective and economic outcomes that can be contrasted to the failed neo-liberal conservative project. However, this vision is overly optimistic as this scenario seems to offer citizens, who are dependent on equitable public policies, an ethical framework that is too weak to sustain the re-discovery of the virtuous notion of responsibility towards the state. Instead, the question arises as to whether the exhortations of policy makers for lower income communities to participate in altruistic involvement for the delivery of public services and the governance of community affairs is fundamentally misplaced in an overly confident managerialist rhetoric (Active Communities Directorate, 2004; Blunkett, 2003, 2004; Chanan, 2003; Civil Renewal Unit, 2003, 2004, 2005; Home Office Research, 2003; 2004a, b; ODPM 2005a, b, c; Rodgers and Robinson 2005).
Furthermore, governance by performance objectives, geared to efficiency and effectiveness, throws up the challenge of how desired “outputs” and “outcomes” are achievable without overt government intervention. So, the ethically sceptical citizen, having been deprived of the deontological bond of trust with the state after suffering what could be regarded as the unprincipled nature of market transactions might have their sceptical assumptions re-enforced as the regulatory state exerts its political authority to achieve its aims and objectives. This authority perceives “society as comprised of a web of obligations, which may override individual freedom: obligations amongst individuals in communities and between the citizen and the state” (Driver and Martell, 1998: 169). Thus, the state can demand that the individual fulfil their civil duties without offering reciprocal obligations in return.
Conclusion
In its traditional role, the British State was informed by deontological ethical principles that decreed if the state exercised extensive power to control the lives of its citizens this power should be exercised in conjunction with benevolent paternalism. Thus, an ethereal bond existed that fostered the virtues of paternalism, obedience and compliance in lower income communities as an elite accepted responsibility for the state’s decision–making and action-taking processes. However, the neo-liberal conservative project, underpinned by consequentialist ethical principles, was committed to the state refraining from interfering in the lives of citizens as they pursued their own legal pleasures. Implicit within this paradigm is the precept that the cost of government administration should be minimised by use of the mechanisms of the free market, which are more effective and efficient than centralised bureaucracies. However, some citizens, particularly those on a low income, experienced the outcome of market transactions that were adverse or difficult to comprehend. Thus, it is contended that ethical scepticism grew alongside distrust of market solutions for the delivery of essential public services.
The second contention is that new labour’s political elite, with their belief in the managerialised, regulatory and ethically hybrid state, have been unable to reverse the growth of ethical scepticism despite their concern to promote active citizenship and civil renewal. This may reflect new labour’s constitutional radicalism, which places an emphasis on individual responsibilities rather than individual rights.
Therefore, it is appropriate that a debate should take place over what constitutes the public good. This should address the importance that society wishes to accord to the values of equity, distributional justice, community solidarity and social stability in the regulatory provision of public services. John Stuart Mill captures the risks inherent in neglecting this dialogue:
a State which dwarfs its men, in order that they may be more docile instruments in its hands even for beneficial purposes – would find that with small men no great thing can really be accomplished (Mill, [1859] 1989: 15).
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